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Intrusion Alert Prediction Using a Hidden
Markov Model
Udaya Sampath K. Perera Miriya Thanthrige, Jagath Samarabandu and Xianbin Wang
Abstract—Intrusion detection is only a starting step in securing IT infrastructure. Prediction of intrusions is the next step to provide an
active defense against incoming attacks. Current intrusion prediction methods focus mainly on prediction of either intrusion type or
intrusion category and do not use or provide contextual information such as source and target IP address. In addition most of them are
dependant on domain knowledge and specific scenario knowledge. The proposed algorithm employs a bag-of-words model together
with a hidden Markov model which not depend on specific domain knowledge. Since this algorithm depends on a training process it is
adaptable to different conditions. A key advantage of the proposed algorithm is the inclusion of contextual data such as source IP
address, destination IP range, alert type and alert category in its prediction, which is crucial for an eventual response. Experiments
conducted using a public data set generated over 2500 alert predictions and achieved accuracy of 81% and 77% for single step and
five step predictions respectively for prediction of the next alert cluster. It also achieved an accuracy of prediction of 95% and 92% for
single step and five step predictions respectively for prediction of the next alert category. The proposed methods achieved a prediction
accuracy improvement of 5% for alert category over existing variable length Markov chain intrusion prediction methods, while providing
more information for a possible defense.
Index Terms—Hidden Markov Model, Intrusion Alerts, Intrusion Detection, Intrusion Response, Intrusion Prediction, Intrusion Alerts
Prediction.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
HUMAN activities associated with computational de-vices are rapidly growing day by day. Nowadays
most smart devices are capable of connecting to the inter-
net. The world is becoming a more connected place and
people are heavily relying on services offered based on
computer networks. With such a high involvement with
interconnected devices, sensitive and valuable information
are rapidly exchanging between computer networks and
devices. Initially, most of the research activities were focused
on intrusion detection methods. Such intrusion detection
systems identify the attacks that have already happened or
currently happening in the network. To improve network
security, advanced system models are required, which are
able to detect impending or ongoing intrusions and take
countermeasures to stop intrusion activities. Researchers are
focusing on developing sophisticated Intrusion Response
System (IRS) to fulfill this requirement.
Prediction of future intrusion activities plays a key role in
intrusion response, which helps in identifying and execut-
ing response actions before an intrusion occurs. Intrusion
detection systems (IDSs) generate intrusion alerts once they
detect network intrusions. These intrusion alerts can then
be used to understand attacker strategies and predict future
network intrusions.
Most of the previous intrusion prediction methods were
mainly focused on prediction of either alert type or alert
category (i.e. identification of next stage attack) [1]. A proper
response action cannot be executed by only knowing future
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intrusion type or intrusion category. In order to execute
useful response action, it is important to predict other
important parameters such as the attacker and the victim
of the attack. A response action can then be executed on
a specific network segment without unduly affecting the
whole network. In addition response actions may be tar-
geted specifically to the attacker.
In this paper, we propose A Hidden Markov model based
algorithm for predicting the next intrusion alert, given a
sequence of intrusion alerts from an existing IDS tool such
as ”Snort”. Our Proposed alert prediction method is based
on prediction of the next alert cluster, which contains source
IP address, destination IP range, alert type and alert cate-
gory. Hence, prediction of next alert cluster provides more
information about future strategies of the attacker. Also,
Our Proposed alert prediction method does not depend
on specific domain knowledge. Instead, it depends on a
training process. Hence the proposed algorithm is adaptable
to different conditions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II describes related work on intrusion prediction. Section
III describes architecture of the proposed alert prediction
framework, which includes the Bag of Words (BoW) model
based k-means alert clustering process and implementation
of HMM for alert prediction. Section IV presents perfor-
mance evaluation of proposed alert prediction method with
respect to the number of clusters and HMM parameters.
It also compares prediction accuracy of alert cluster based
sequence modeling and alert category based sequence mod-
eling. Section V includes critical analysis of results and
challenges involve in the alert prediction process.
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2 RELATED WORK
Intrusion prediction can be mainly categorized as network
attack graph based prediction [2], [3], [4] and predictions
based on sequence modeling techniques (such as Markov
Model, Hidden Markov Model, Bayesian Networks and
Dynamic Programming) [5], [6], [7]. Hidden Markov Model
(HMM) is one of the widely used sequential data modeling
methods which was introduced in the late 1960s by Baum
and his colleagues [8], [9]. Due to the rich mathematical
structure of HMM, it widely applied in real world applica-
tions such as speech recognition, handwriting pattern recog-
nition, gesture recognition, intrusion detection and speech
tagging.
Intrusion alerts typically contain two fields that are used
to identify an intrusion which caused the corresponding
intrusion alert. These fields are called “alert type” and “alert
category.” Alert type contains detailed information about an
intrusion whereas alert category contains higher level infor-
mation about an intrusion. Most of the previous intrusion
prediction methods were mainly focused on prediction of
either alert type or alert category. A proper response action
cannot be executed by only knowing future intrusion type
or intrusion category.
Qin and Lee proposed attack projection scheme based on
probabilistic reasoning method [10]. They used attack tree
to develop Bayesian network. The main limitation of this
process is prediction depends on the availability of an attack
plan library. Also, it requires mapping best possible attack
graph for a given observation scenario.
Similar to the method proposed by Qin and Lee, Ramki
et al. proposed Bayesian network based directed acyclic
graph (DAG) aided alert prediction method [11] where
they evaluated the correlation between alert types. Based
on correlation and generated attack graph, they predicted
next possible alert type that can occur. They used the
DARPA2000 dataset [12] for their alert type prediction.
Li et al. [2] proposed attack graph based intrusion prediction
method. They used association rule mining to generate
attack graphs. By observing the attack graph, it is possible
to predict possible future steps once several initial steps are
observed. They used the DARPA1999 [12] and DARPA2000
[12] datasets for their experiments.
Multi-stage attack forecasts based on probabilistic matching
was proposed by Cheng et al. where prediction of attack
steps were done by measuring the difference between the
stored and the actual multi-stage attack session graphs
(ASG) [1]. Their method was inspired by the generalized
Hough transform and polygonal curves mapping concept.
Probabilistic mapping does not require exact mapping,
therefore, this method performs better when it compare
with exact mapping techniques such as Longest Common
Sub-sequence (LCS) algorithm. The major limitation of this
method is that prediction depends on the availability of an
attack graph library.
Lippmann et al. analyzed attack graph generation methods
proposed by various researchers and illustrated that most
of these graph generation involved network with less than
20 nodes and most of them had poor capability of scaling
[13]. This finding indicates that intrusion activity prediction
methods based on attack graphs are not very feasible to
employ in practice due to scaling issues.
Fava et al. [5] proposed Cyberattacks projecting method
using variable-length markov models. They have selected
three alert attributes namely alert category, alert description
and destination IP address of an alert as symbols in the
Markov model and generated three different Markov mod-
els for alert category, alert description and destination IP
address. Using these models, they predicted the next alert
category, next alert description and destination IP address
separately.
One main limitation of their method is that they are predict-
ing alert type, alert category and destination IP separately.
So there are possibilities that combination of these three
may not be a valid combination. As an example, the pre-
dicted alert category is “Intrusion Root” and predicted alert
description is “ICMP PING NMAP”. However, predicted
alert description does not belong to the predicted alert
category. To address this limitation, Du et al. [6] presented
an ensemble techniques based alert attribute combination
method. Based on ensemble techniques, they have a pro-
posed method to convert VMM alert prediction output to a
score with respect to the host of the network. This score is
used to predict next possible host that can be attacked. Major
limitation of their method is that they have only interested
to predict next host without predicting attack type.
Our proposed alert prediction framework is different from
existing approaches in following aspects: It does not depend
on specific domain knowledge. Instead, it depends on a
training process. Hence the proposed algorithm is adaptable
to different conditions. Also, it is based on prediction of
the next alert cluster, which contains source IP address,
destination IP range, alert type and alert category. Hence,
prediction of next alert cluster provides more information
about future strategies of the attacker.
3 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
The proposed alert prediction module consists of three main
modules called alert pre-processing module, alert clustering
module and alert prediction module as shown in Figure 1.
Output of the alert prediction module is forwarded onto
intrusion response module. In this paper, sequential data
modeling concept was employed to predict next possible
intrusion alert for a given historical alert sequence. HMM
was used as sequential data modeling method. To build
a sequential data series in network security domain, alert
clustering concept was used. Intrusion alerts were clus-
tered based on their feature similarities and then for a
given sequence of alerts, alert clustering module produced
a sequence of clusters. Those sequence of clusters were
considered to build a sequential data series in our model.
The HMM is used to predict next cluster using the sequence
data series which was built in previous step. Since predicted
cluster represents certain characteristics of alert attributes,
that information can be used by intrusion response module
to select and execute relevant response actions to mitigate
future intrusions.
3.1 Alert Pre-Processing and Clustering
Intrusion alerts generated by intrusion detection systems
(IDSs) was utilized by the proposed alert prediction frame-
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Fig. 1. Proposed hidden Markov model based alert prediction module.
work. Snort was used as an intrusion detection system [14]
for this work. Snort is an open-source network intrusion
detection system (NIDS) [14] . A Snort alert consists two
major fields that are used to identify an intrusion which
caused the corresponding intrusion alert. These fields are
called “alert type” (also known as alert description or alert
signature) and “alert category” (also known as alert sig-
nature class). The first step of the pre-processing was to
format raw alerts from different IDSs to a common format
and then duplicated alerts were removed using selected
features. Timestamp, source IP, source port, destination IP,
destination port, alert signature and alert signature class
were used to identify duplicate alerts. The main objective of
alert clustering process is to generate a sequence of symbols
that can be modeled using sequential data modeling. Bag
of Words (BoW) model, which is a popular concept in text
document classification and k-means clustering algorithm
were used to cluster alerts.
3.1.1 Bag of Words (BoW) Model
Bag of Words (BoW) model is a popular document analysis
algorithm used in text and image classification. Few sample
alerts created by Snort is shown in table 1 were used to
illustrate this process. In the first step, important attributes
of alert were selected to develop vocabulary. Source IP
address, source IP port, destination IP address, destination
IP port, signature (alert type) and signature class (alert
category) were selected to generate vocabulary. Each unique
word in alert attributes was added to the vocabulary. IP
address was treated in a special way where four segments
of an address was considered as four separate words. BoW
vocabulary which was generated from sample alerts shown
in table 1 is shown in table 2. The next step is to cluster alerts
based on their attributes. For the clustering process, k-means
clustering algorithm was used. The k-means algorithm was
first used by James MacQueen in 1967 [15]. Historical alerts
were used to generate set of alerts clusters. Once new alert
TABLE 1
Few Snort alerts.
Source IP Destination IP Alert Type ID AlertCategory
172.16.112.100 172.16.112.20 650 attempted-recon
172.16.112.50 172.16.113.169 506 sdf
172.16.116.201 206.83.105.134 36489 trojan-activity
207.25.71.186 172.16.117.132 684 unknown
209.87.178.183 192.168.5.122 41297 web-application-attack
TABLE 2
BoW vocabulary generated from alerts shown in table 1.
Bag of Words Vocabulary
activity application attack attempted recon sdf trojan unknown web
16 168 169 172 178 183 186 192 50
83 87 105 112 113 115 116 117
684 71 207 209 25 506 650 20
206 134 36489 201 100 122 132 41297
TABLE 3
BoW vocabulary clusters generated from alerts shown in table 1.
Cluster Name Elements in Clusters
Cluster 0 87 183 178 209 41297 168 192 122 web application
Cluster 1 172 16 112 113 169 50 506 178 168 sdf
Cluster 2 206 172 36489 16 134 83 201 116 105 trojan
Cluster 3 71 132 207 25 172 16 684 186 117 unknown
Cluster 4 16 172 100 112 115 20 650 186 recon attempted
was received, it was assigned to the best matching cluster
using k-means algorithm.
The main objective of clustering is to combine alert at-
tributes and generates a single unit that represents different
alerts attributes. This single unit is the cluster ID. A Cluster
ID sequence for given input alert sequence was generated
by the alert clustering module and that sequence was used
as a sequential data series in our model. This sequential data
series was used to build HMM module and predict future
alert clusters.
Let k be the number of clusters was generated by k-means
algorithm (represent cluster set C = {C1, C2, ..., Ci, ..., Ck}).
Furthermore, T number of alerts ordered based on
their time of origin (timestamp) was represented as
A1, A2, ..., Ai, ..., Ak. The best matching cluster (from clus-
ter set C) for each alert was assigned by the alert clustering
module. To illustrate alert clustering process, total number
of clusters was selected as five and then vocabulary (which
was generated in previous step) was clustered to five clus-
ters by the k-means clustering module. These clusters are
shown in table 3. Based on these observations, it can be seen
that cluster 0 represents “web application attack” between
IP address 209.87.178.183 and IP address 192.168.5.122, clus-
ter 2 represents “trojan activity attack” between IP address
172.16.116.201 and IP address 206.83.105.134 and so on.
When a new alert was received, the best matching cluster
for that alert was assigned by the alert clustering module
based on alert attributes.
3.2 Building Hidden Markov Models
A hidden Markov model was used to model sequential data
produced from alert clustering module. HMM consist of
hidden states which produced the observations. Alert clus-
ter sequence was considered as an observation sequence in
this model. Parameters of hidden Markov model is defined
as:
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1) N, Number of hidden states in the HMM. Where in-
dividual states are denoted as S = {S1, S2, . . . , SN}
and state at time t is denoted as qt.
2) M, Number of distinct observation symbols per
state. Where individual symbols are denoted as
V = {v1, v2, . . . , vM}.
3) State transition probability (A) NxN matrix. Where
aij represents the state transition probability form
state i to state j.
aij = P (qt+1 = Sj |qt = Si), where 1 ≤ i ≤
Nand1 ≤ j ≤ N .
4) Observation emission probability (B) NxM matrix.
Where kth observation emission probability of the
state j is represented by bj(k).
bj(k) = P (vk at t|qt = Sj), where 1 ≤ j ≤ N, 1 ≤
k ≤M .
5) Initial state probability distribution (pi). Where pi
represents the initial states probabilities of the
HMM.
pii = P (q1 = Si), 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
6) Observation sequence (O). The observation
sequence of length T is represented as
O = O1, O2, . . . , Ot, . . . , OT , Where Ot is one
of observation symbol from V.
In our model, observations are distinct alert cluster IDs gen-
erated from alert clustering module. The cluster ID sequence
generated by historical alerts was used to train the HMM.
HMM was trained using Baum-Welch algorithm [16].
3.2.1 Hidden Markov Model Based Sequence Prediction
Trained HMM was used to predict next alert clusters based
on observed alert cluster sequence.
Notation:
• Trained HMM λ = (A, B, pi).
• T = Length of observed testing alert sequence.
• k = Number of clusters generated by k-means clus-
tering module.
• Cluster set generated by k-means C =
{C1, C2, ..., Ct, ..., Ck}.
• Observed testing alert sequence δ =
A1, A2, . . . , At, . . . , AT .
• Corresponding cluster sequence for observed testing
alert sequence ω = CA1, CA2, . . . , CAt, . . . , CAT
where CAt ∈ C for 1 ≤ t ≤ T.
• Observation sequence O = O1, O2, . . . , Ot, . . . , OT .
In this model, observed alert cluster sequence was taken as
observation sequence.
Hence, O = ω = CA1, CA2, . . . , CAt, . . . , CAT .
The best hidden state sequence for the observed testing
cluster ID sequence (ω = CA1, CA2, . . . , CAt, . . . , CAT )
was identified using Viterbi algorithm.
Let Q = q1, q2, . . . , qt, . . . , qT is the best hidden alert se-
quence. Using state transition probability matrix (A) and
observation emission probability matrix (B), probability of
each cluster for the next position is calculated. Based on the
probabilities of clusters, the best possible candidate for next
cluster is selected. Let last element of Q was Sj . Probability
of cluster Ci to be in next observation (PT+1 (Ci)) can be
calculated using equation 1:
PT+1 (Ci) =
N∑
r=1
ajr br(i).
Where Ci ∈ C .
(1)
Using equation 1, probability of each cluster to be in next
position was calculated. In this model, three possible clus-
ters were identified for next observation based on their
probability values. These three were labeled as level 1, 2 and
3 prediction. Level 1 prediction includes cluster which has
the highest probability. Level 2 prediction includes highest
and second highest probability clusters. Level 3 prediction
includes first, second and third highest probability clusters.
For multiple step prediction (prediction of many data points
in one prediction step), alert cluster which was predicted in
previous prediction stage was appended to input observa-
tion sequence when predicting next point.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
The DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency)
[12] dataset was used in the experimental process. It con-
sists of two multi-stage attacks labeled LLDOS 1.0 and
LLDOS 2.0.2. Both these attacks have five main stages
[12]. Alert pre-processing and Hidden Markov model based
alert prediction modules were implemented using python
programming language. Snort IDS (version 2.9.8.0 with rule
set 2980) was used for intrusion alert generation. MYSQL
database was used as a database for the platform. Bag
of words model implementation and k-means clustering
implementation was done using python scikit-learn library
[17].
DARPA 2000 raw network packets were sent into Snort
intrusion detection system to generate alerts. 11,264 and
10,468 raw alerts were generated by LLDOS 1.0 and LL-
DOS 2.0.2 respectively. These alerts were then sent into the
alert pre-processing module. Redundant alerts with same
attributes were filtered by the alert pre-processing module.
After this process the total number of alerts were reduced to
5113 and 5645 respectively. During the next step, these alerts
were forwarded to the alert clustering module.
9 alerts categories and 21 alerts descriptions were produced
for LLDOS 1.0 while 9 alerts categories and 19 alerts descrip-
tions were produced for LLDOS 2.0.2 by Snort IDS. DARPA
2000 LLDOS 1.0 was used for vocabulary generation and
then that vocabulary was clustered using the k-means algo-
rithm. There were 243 unique words in the vocabulary. The
DARPA 2000 LLDOS 2.0.2 was used as a test network that
must be monitored and predicted future activities.
4.1 Alert Prediction
Performance evaluation of HMM based alert prediction
module was performed using the alert cluster ID sequence
generated by DARPA 2000 LLDOS 2.0.2 dataset. The length
of the cluster ID sequence generated for DARPA 2000 LL-
DOS 2.0.2 was 5645. 2500 data points were used to train
HMM and other segment was used to evaluate prediction
capabilities of the model.
In order to easily compare our results with existing alert
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prediction research activities, three accuracy values were
calculated as shown in below.
1) Level 1 prediction accuracy (αL1). In level 1 predic-
tion accuracy, a correct prediction means that, most
probable prediction of the alert prediction frame-
work is matched with next action of the attacker.
2) Level 2 prediction accuracy (αL2). In level 2 pre-
diction accuracy, a correct prediction means that,
one of two most probable predictions of the alert
prediction framework is matched with next action
of the attacker.
3) Level 3 prediction accuracy (αL3). In level 3 predic-
tion accuracy, a correct prediction means that, one
of three most probable predictions of alert predic-
tion framework is matched with next action of the
attacker.
Following experiments were conducted to evaluate
performance of proposed alert prediction framework.
4.1.1 Performance Evaluation of Next Alert Cluster
Prediction
• Effect of number of hidden states in HMM on the
prediction accuracy
There is no straightforward method to determine the best
number of hidden states of a HMM [16]. To find out the
best model, number of hidden states were changed from
2 to 10 with increment of 1 at a time. Accuracy of alert
prediction are shown in Figure 2. The maximum αL1
was observed as 67% for a HMM with 8 hidden states.
The lowest αL1 was observed as 43% for a HMM with
2 hidden states. It was observed that, with the increment
of the number of states αL1 was initially increased and
then decreased. The maximum αL3 was observed as 84%
for a HMM with 7 hidden states. αL1 was changed from
43% to 67% with the varying number of hidden states.
During the experiments cluster size was kept at 10. A HMM
with 8 hidden states was achieved the maximum accuracy
of prediction (αL1). Therefore, that HMM module was
selected for other experiments beyond this point.
• Effect of the training length on the prediction accu-
racy
Variation of prediction accuracy (αL1) with the length of
the training sequence is shown in Figure 3. The length of
training sequence was changed from 500 to 3500 with the
increments of 500 at a time. The remaining segment was
used to evaluate prediction performance. Results indicate
that, insufficient training lengths produce very low αL1
(around 20%) for training length 500 and 1000. With the
increment of training length αL1 was increased and the
maximum value for αL1 was recorded as 73% for the
training length of 3500.
• Effect of number of clusters on the prediction accu-
racy
Fig. 2. Prediction accuracy of alert clusters variation with number of
states in HMM.
Fig. 3. Level 1 prediction accuracy (αL1) of alert clusters variation with
length of training sequence.
To illustrate the impact on the size of unique observation
symbols, number of clusters were changed from 5 to 50.
Alert perdition accuracy variation with the number of
clusters is shown in Figure 4. It is obvious that, a high
number of clusters produced better separation among alerts
and which result in better grouping. For DARPA dataset
there were 9 different alert categories and 19 different
alert types produced by Snort. Therefore, in order to
group alerts by their corresponding alert category and
corresponding alert type at least 9 and 19 clusters were
required respectively. The maximum value for αL1 was 88%
recorded for 5 clusters and the lowest 31% was recorded for
50 clusters. However, up to 30 clusters αL3 was remained
over 70%. It was observed that HMM prediction fail to
achieve better accuracy for higher observation symbol size.
• Performance evaluation of multiple intrusions pre-
dictions
To examine the multiple data points prediction capability
of HMM prediction module, the length of prediction (l)
was changed from 1 to 5 and accuracy of prediction was
recorded for 10 clusters. Accuracy of predictions is shown
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Fig. 4. Prediction accuracy of alert clusters variation with number of
clusters.
Fig. 5. Prediction accuracy of alert clusters variation with multiple data
point prediction.
in Figure 5. It was observed that, with the increment of
prediction length accuracy of prediction was decreased. One
data point prediction achieved the highest accuracy of 67%,
77% and 81% for αL1, αL2 and αL3 correspondingly while
five data point prediction achieved lowest with 53%, 65%
and 77% correspondingly.
4.1.2 Performance Evaluation of Next Alert Category (alert
class) Prediction
Most of alert prediction research activities were largely
focused on predicting future alert category. In order to
compare proposed alert prediction framework with other
network intrusion prediction research activities, alert
category based prediction was evaluated. For following
experiments, sequential data series was generated by
considering an alert category as an observation. For DARPA
2000 LLDOS 2.0.2 dataset 9 different alert categories were
generated by Snort. These alerts categories were mapped
to the symbols. By using this mapping, alert sequence
generated for LLDOS 2.0.2 was converted to a symbol
series. Similar to the other experiments 2500 data points
were used to train HMM and the remaining segment was
used to evaluate prediction performance.
• Effect of number of hidden states in HMM on the
prediction accuracy
To evaluate the accuracy of alert prediction with the number
of hidden states, the number of hidden states were changed
Fig. 6. Prediction accuracy of alert category variation with number of
hidden states in HMM.
Fig. 7. Prediction accuracy of alert category variation with multiple data
point prediction.
from 2 to 10 with increment of 2 at a time. The results of this
experiment is shown in Figure 6. The maximum αL1 of 76%
was recorded for HMMs with 6 and 8 number of hidden
states. Also, it was observed that sudden drop of accuracy
was recorded for a HMM with 10 hidden states. It was
observed that, for this model number of hidden states were
higher than the number of unique observations. Also, 10%
of αL3 accuracy improvement was observed for prediction
of alert categories compared to prediction of alert clusters
size of 10.
• Performance evaluation of multiple intrusions pre-
dictions
To examine the multiple data points prediction capability
of the HMM prediction module, the length of prediction
(l) was changed from 1 to 5 and accuracy of prediction
was recorded. Accuracy of future alert category predictions
is shown in Figure 7. With the increment of prediction
length, the prediction accuracy was decreased. The max-
imum prediction accuracies for αL1, αL2 and αL3 were
observed as 76%, 91% and 94% correspondingly for single
intrusion prediction while the lowest was observed for 5
intrusions prediction as 72%, 88% and 92% respectively.
Fava et al. [5] presented a Cyberattacks projecting method
using variable-length markov models. which is the most
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similar work related to our work. The major differences
between their approach and the proposed algorithm is that
they have generated three separate Markov models for
alert category, alert description and destination IP address
attributes of an alert. By using these models, they predicted
the next alert category, next alert description and destination
IP address separately. With this approach, they achieved
an accuracy of 90% for αL3 for predicting the next alert
category. When the prediction algorithm proposed in this
paper was constrained to only predict the alert category
without additional information, it obtained an accuracy of
95% for αL3. Following are the key differences between the
proposed algorithm and that of Fava et al. method:
1) Fava et al. used a different dataset for their experi-
ments whereas this paper presents results from the
DARPA data set.
2) The closest result that can be compared is the pre-
diction of next alert category. The DARPA data set
has nine unique alert categories whereas Fava et al.
doesnot disclose the number of unique alert types
that present in dataset that they used.
3) When the proposed alert prediction framework was
used to predict the alert category as well as the
source IP address, the destination IP address, and
the alert type, it achieved a level 3 prediction accu-
racy (αL3) of 81%, 81%, 76%, 78%, 75% and 72% for
cluster sizes of 10, 12, 14, 16, 18 and 20 respectively.
Even thought the proposed alert cluster prediction
achieved lower prediction accuracy compared to
Fava et al. method, it provides critical information
the intrusion which will be essential for any re-
sponse.
5 CONCLUSION
In this paper, a hidden Markov method based alert predic-
tion framework is proposed. Alert clustering is employed to
group selected alert attributes together. A given sequence of
alerts is converted to a sequence of alert clusters and then
a HMM is used to predict future alert clusters based on
the input. The proposed algorithm also provides the alert
category as well as the source IP address, the destination IP
address, and the alert type, which are critical in responding
to an intrusion.
Based on the results, it is observed that a smaller number of
clusters tend to improve prediction accuracy. The maximum
value of αL3 was 88% for 5 clusters and the lowest 31% was
recorded for 50 clusters. When the number of clusters are
smaller, it results in a smaller set of unique symbols for the
HMM model which improves the learning abilities of the
HMM model compared to a larger symbol size. However,
when the number of clusters are smaller, it will hinder the
separation of unique alert types and cause merging of two
or more alert types. As an example, in the DARPA data
set, there are nine unique alerts categories generated by
Snort IDS. Therefore, if the number of clusters are less than
nine, then one alert cluster may include more than one alert
category which hinders the prediction.
Also, the experimental results indicated that when the
number of hidden states are lower than the number of
observations (i.e. when the number of observations are 10
and the number of hidden states are between 2 to 4), level
1 prediction accuracy (αL1) is lower compared to higher
number of hidden states (i.e. number of hidden states are
between 5 to 8). It is observed that the maximum αL1
difference was 24% for these two scenarios. This shows
that when the number of hidden states are low, it may not
be possible to model the system states changes efficiently
because not enough states are available to represent state
transition during a multi-stage intrusion scenario.
There are still some challenges that need to be addressed
in the proposed alert prediction framework. They include
increasing the prediction accuracy with the increase of
cluster size and predicting intrusion types that not present
in the training data set. Currently it is not possible to
predict an intrusion type if that not present in the training
data set. Another challenge is identifying false alerts and
misleading intrusion actions generated by the attacker in
order to mislead intrusion detection systems.
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